Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats. Critical Challenge: National Preparedness Over one hundred recommendations for corrective action flow from these lessons and are outlined in detail in Appendix A of the Report. This chapter summarizes the challenges that ultimately led to the lessons we have learned. Yet each, particularly when taken in aggregate, directly affected the overall efficiency and effectiveness of our efforts. Others had an impact on a specific, discrete operational capability. Some of these seventeen critical challenges affected all aspects of the Federal response. These three will be discussed in the Reports last chapter, Transforming National Preparedness. 2 Three other challenges Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned Homeland Security Professional Development and Education and Citizen and Community Preparedness are interconnected to the others but reflect measures and institutions that improve our preparedness more broadly. Fourteen of these critical challenges were highlighted in the preceding Week of Crisis section and range from high-level policy and planning issues (e.g., the Integrated Use of Military Capabilities) to operational matters (e.g., Search and Rescue). These lessons, which flow from the critical challenges we encountered, are depicted in the accompanying text box. We must move promptly to understand precisely what went wrong and determine how we are going to fix it.Īfter reviewing and analyzing the response to Hurricane Katrina, we identified seventeen specific lessons the Federal government has learned. Rather, we endeavor to find the answers in order to identify systemic gaps and improve our preparedness for the next disaster natural or man-made. Homeland Security Professional Development and Education.Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned.Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal.Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment.Integrated Use of Military Capabilities.This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEcĬitations: View citations in EconPapers (83) Track citations by RSS feed JEL-codes: Q54 R11 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers) After Hurricane Katrina, will the city of New Orleans continue to be a preferred location for more than 400,000 residents and their employers? Or will the disaster shift the city to a new equilibrium level of employment and population? The more basic positive question of whether the city will come back, however, is fundamentally an economic one. Many environmental scientists question whether such a rebuilding would be sensible, given the city's precarious geological position and the contribution of past land reclamation to the city's current vulnerability. Will the future New Orleans bear any resemblance to the city that existed prior to Katrina? Most government authorities, from city officials to federal spokespersons, insist that New Orleans must - and should - be fully rebuilt. Census Bureau estimates indicate that almost two years after the storm, by July 1, 2007, nearly half of these evacuees had yet to return. In less than a week, the city's population declined from over 400,000 to near zero. Much of the city and its surrounding suburbs were inundated those residents of the city who had not heeded warnings to flee the approaching storm were evacuated in its wake. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina swept into Louisiana and New Orleans, a city built largely on land reclaimed from swamp, witnessed massive failures in its levees. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2008, vol. The Economic Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
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